Jawar Mohammed engagement report

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• Oct 10, 20262.4x their median

  Before urging the UN to intervene, shouldn’t Eritrea at least withdraw its armed forces that have been deployed deep inside Ethiopian territory? https://t.co/8O9lHRCgIl

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• Oct 12, 20262.3x their median

  Good News: I have just been informed that General Tadesse Worede and the other officers have been freed. They are now in the hands of ENDF/TPF forces and are reportedly safe. It is worth recalling that these officers were arrested by the TPLF and later transferred out of Mekelle toward the northern frontier, raising fears that they might be handed over to the Eritrean regime.

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• Oct 7, 20262.0x their median

  Isaias May Have Made the Move Abiy Was Waiting For Deutsche Welle reports that Eritrean troops are moving deeper into central Tigray, marking a major escalation in a conflict increasingly drawing Ethiopia and Eritrea toward direct confrontation. So far, Abiy has restrained Ethiopian forces from directly engaging Eritrean troops crossing the border, despite the sharp rhetorical escalation between Addis Ababa and Asmara. He also refrained from using airpower against TPLF leaders who fled into Eritrea. If he was waiting for Isaias to make the first unmistakable move, that moment may now have arrived. Isaias appears to have moved first despite explicit warnings from the United States and the European Union, both of which have called for respect for Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and urged external actors to avoid steps that could widen the war. If Eritrean forces are now operating openly deeper inside Ethiopian territory, it will become increasingly difficult for the international community to demand restraint from Addis Ababa without acknowledging Ethiopia’s right to defend its territory. Continued restraint could also become politically and militarily difficult for Abiy if Eritrean forces keep advancing while Ethiopian forces are ordered not to engage them. A direct Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to avoid. The longer Eritrean forces remain or advance inside Ethiopian territory, the greater the pressure on Addis Ababa to respond militarily. The Ethiopian parliament may therefore soon be pushed to consider a formal declaration of war.

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• Oct 2, 20262.0x their median

  ሰላም! ለሰው ልጆች ሰላም! ለሰው ልጆች ፍቅር! ለሰው ልጆች በአለም ዙሪያ ሁሉ፣ ሰላም ይሁን ምድሩ ሁሉ! https://t.co/8Foh4E4wEc

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• Oct 17, 20261.9x their median

  ህወሀቶች የመቀሌን ኤርፖርት ለመምታት አስጠነቀቁ ነው የምትሉኝ? ከሆነ፣ እውነትም ይህ ቡድን አንዳበቃለት አረጋግጧል። የሚያረጉት አይመስለኝም፣ ግን እንደፎከሩት ካደረጉትና በሲቪል አውሮፕላኖች እና ኤርፖርት ላይ ጥቃት ከፈፀሙ ለአብይ ተጨማሪ ውለታ ይሆንለታል። ምክንያቱም... 1. በሲቪል አውሮፕላንም ሆነ ኤርፖርት ላይ እርምጃ መውሰድ automatically በአላም አቀፉዐማህበረሰብ ያስወግዛቸዋል። 2.በሽበርትኝነት ያስፈርጃቸዋል። 3 የህወሀት በሲቪል አቬዬሽን ላይ እርምጃ መውሰድ መሸሸጊያ የሆነችውን ኤርትራን ለባሰ አደጋ ያጋልጣታል። በተለይ እርምጃው በሚሳኤል ከሆነ የሚሰነዘረው ከኤርትራ ግዛት ስለሚሆን፣ አቢይ አስመራ ላይ ለመዝመት ተጨመሪ ዲፕሎማሲያዊ ፈቃድ ያስገኝለታል። በቅርቡ ህወሀት የሚያወጣቸው መግለጨዎች እና የሚወስዳቸው እርምጃዎች በብልጽግና የተቀረጹ ነው የሚመስሉት ፡) ምክንያቱም መግለጫዎቹም ሆኑ እርምጃዎቹ የብልጽግናን ፍላጎት የሚያሞሉ ናቸው።

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• Oct 7, 20261.7x their median

  In a further escalation, BBC is now also reporting, citing residents in Adigrat, that Eritrean troops have moved past the town and deeper into Ethiopian territory. This brings Eritrean and Ethiopian forces significantly closer to a direct encounter and raises the risk of a direct Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation. At this stage, Isaias’s move can no longer be read simply as defensive posturing along the border. The reported movement deeper into Ethiopian territory points instead to an increasingly offensive military deployment.

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• Oct 25, 20261.6x their median

  Dear Honorable @FarahMaalimM I have been concerned by some of your recent media remarks regarding the Gari-Borana conflict in Moyale. I worry that the framing, however well-intentioned, could inadvertently heighten tensions rather than contribute to resolving them. This is not an ethnic-level Oromo-Somali conflict, but rather a recurring dispute between two clans with close kinship ties, a shared language, and a common territory. Such disputes have persisted intermittently for decades and are sometimes exacerbated by cross-border contraband traders and unscrupulous security operatives. I therefore believe it is important to approach the situation with caution and avoid framing a localized conflict in ways that could turn it into a broader ethnic or national confrontation. Sadly, this is not the first time you have made inflammatory remarks of this nature. A few years ago, when tensions arose between Somalia and Ethiopia, you delivered an incendiary speech directed at the Oromo, which was followed by reports of harassment and assaults against Oromo refugees in towns across Somalia. Such incidents underscore the potential consequences of rhetoric that risks inflaming ethnic tensions. Brother Farah, I know you personally, and our relationship goes beyond politics. We have shared both good and difficult times. I have had the pleasure of hosting you in my home in Addis Ababa, and you have graciously welcomed me into yours, where I enjoyed a wonderful meal with your family. You were also among the first people to reach out and offer help when I recently faced a dangerous situation. I recall these moments because I know you as a fundamentally good-hearted and caring person, and I write to you in that same spirit of friendship and mutual respect. As an elder statesman, you are someone whom I and many other younger politicians have looked to for advice, wisdom, and guidance on important national and regional issues. Precisely because I hold you in such high regard, I hope you will understand my concern. Your words carry weight, and with that comes a responsibility to promote restraint, understanding, and peaceful coexistence, especially when tensions are high. Brother, I say this with genuine respect and affection. Please continue to be the voice of wisdom and guidance that we have come to expect from you. Best regards, Your younger brother, Jawar Mohammed

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• Sep 25, 20261.5x their median

  As expected, the TPLF has cut internet and telephone services across Tigray last night, effectively disrupting banking and other essential services. I wonder whether the public was even advised in advance to withdraw cash. The TPLF has walked straight into another trap set by Abiy. He kept the services open and allowed the TPLF to make the decision to shut them down. Now the TPLF, not the federal government, takes the blame for the potentially disastrous impact on civilians, businesses, and the broader economy. In other words, Abiy has once again turned a measure taken by the TPLF into a political liability for the TPLF itself.

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• Oct 4, 2026

  This US statement urging both Eritrea and Ethiopia to avoid further escalation is timely and appropriate. However, that appeal may not hold if Eritrea allows fleeing TPLF rebels to cross the border and launch attacks against Ethiopian forces from its territory. The US and other stakeholders should therefore make the message to President Isaias unmistakably clear: do not allow the TPLF to use Eritrean territory as a staging ground, and pull back Eritrean mechanized forces that reportedly crossed the border in the last few days.

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• Oct 11, 2026

  What Has Changed in Tigray? We are witnessing something unusual in Tigray as town after town, residents come onto the streets to welcome ENDF/TPF forces after the TPLF is pushed out. What first looked to me like an isolated reaction in southern Tigray has continued farther north, with the crowds appearing to grow along the way. When Alamata, the first major town to fall, was taken, I initially thought the explanation was straightforward. The TPLF had long faced political difficulties in the area, and many residents were already hostile toward it. Mekelle surprised me. Even then, I wondered whether the crowds were largely urban youth sympathetic to Getachew Reda, or whether some of the scenes had been encouraged by pro-government networks. But as similar scenes appeared in different cities and towns, including today in Adigrat, where we saw the largest crowd so far, that explanation became increasingly difficult to sustain on its own. What I first thought could be explained locally was beginning to look like a wider pattern. That pattern becomes even more striking when compared with 2020. When the ENDF entered Tigrayan towns then, the dominant images were empty streets, fear and uncertainty, with nothing resembling the public welcomes we are seeing six years later as the TPLF retreats. The contrast raises a much larger question about what has changed inside Tigrayan society during the years in between. Some of that change may reflect exhaustion with TPLF rule. After decades of political dominance, the organisation has been weakened by internal division, disputes among political and military leaders, accusations of corruption and abuse, and another round of mobilisation. Families that already paid an extraordinary price during the previous war may simply have reached the limits of what they are prepared to sacrifice under the same political leadership. Yet dissatisfaction alone does not fully explain why people are willing to express themselves so openly. People can lose confidence in a political movement and still remain quiet when they believe its armed forces may return. Coming onto the streets carries personal and political risk. The growing willingness to do so may therefore indicate that fear of a TPLF return is also receding and that some residents are beginning to see the balance of power inside Tigray differently. That changing perception is probably reinforced by the composition of the forces entering these towns. Residents are seeing ENDF soldiers alongside the Tigray Peace Force, whose members carry Tigrayan symbols and include fighters and commanders from the region. Their presence gives the change of power a recognisably Tigrayan dimension and may make it easier for communities shaped by the experience of the previous war to accept. Years of conflict have also left many people exhausted. When fighting moves away, roads reopen, businesses begin functioning and ordinary life starts returning, relief itself can bring people onto the streets. The same crowd can include people disappointed with the TPLF, people hopeful about a political alternative and people whose immediate concern is simply that their children should not live through another war. Getachew Reda’s return to Mekelle should be understood within this changing political mood. The reception he received suggests that there is still space for Tigrayan political leadership outside the current TPLF establishment, particularly among constituencies frustrated with the direction of the old leadership. For Getachew, however, the moment also carries a warning from his own recent experience. During his leadership of the interim administration, he enjoyed considerable goodwill, especially among younger Tigrayans, and had an opportunity to turn that support into a durable political base. He failed to use that momentum before the old establishment and influential military actors regained the initiative. If another opening is emerging, he will need to understand that public goodwill becomes politically meaningful only when it is organised and translated into a credible alternative. He has already seen how quickly such an opportunity can disappear. These scenes cannot tell us exactly how far the change extends across Tigrayan society. But after Alamata, Mekelle and the succession of towns farther north, it is becoming increasingly difficult to treat what we are seeing as a passing reaction to one military advance. The repetition itself is politically significant in a region where the TPLF once enjoyed an unusually strong identification with the defence of Tigrayan political interests. The deeper question is whether that relationship is now beginning to weaken. The TPLF may be losing territory, but the more consequential loss would be the assumption that Tigrayan society will naturally return to it once the battlefield settles. If that assumption is fading, the struggle over what replaces it may become the defining political contest inside Tigray after the war.

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